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 Abstract  
Using data from 29 countries, this paper is the first attempt to examine whether economic, political and 
social integration explain how well investors, both shareholders and creditors, are protected from 
expropriation by firms. We show that: (i) globalization drives both shareholder and creditor protection; 
(ii) least restrictive markets rather than paternalistic markets matter particularly for shareholders’ 
protection; (iii) the globalization-protection nexus favoured only creditors during the crisis; and (iv) our 
result significantly holds for OECD-member countries.  
 
 
1. Introduction  
While Investor Protection (IP) delineates the extent of legal protection afforded to investors to 
mitigate expropriation by controlling shareholders or managers (Shleifer and Wolfenzon, 2002), 
globalization epitomizes global integration driven by the natural evolution of markets, 
economies, cultures, technologies and governance (Sobol et al., 2018). Globalization of countries 
and markets represents a core development in the last half century (Steenkamp, 2019), though it 
is analogous to a double-edged sword (Djelic and Quack, 2018). Indeed, increasing cross-border 
holdings and external portfolio sizes of countries have ratified the surge of economic-financial 
integration among countries (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2007).  
Extant literature primarily considers economic integration, even though political and social 
integration are effective towards improving risk-sharing and protection (Flood et al., 2012). 
Political and social integration facilitate growth (Alesina et al., 2000), the international 
enforceability of contracts (Balli et al., 2018), and the efficient execution of cross-border mergers 
and acquisitions (Weber and Camerer, 2003). Economic integration is usually the outcome of 
political arrangements and social proximity. Indeed, the European Monetary Union’s institution 
of a common currency uniquely motivates an investigation into the impact of economic and 
socio-political integration. Yet, no evidence exists on whether these forms of global integration 
drive improvements in investor protection laws. Thus, we empirically assess whether, along with 
economic integration, political and social globalization play roles in smoothing the legal 
protection of international investors, both shareholders and creditors. 
 
 
 
2. Data and Methodology 
2.1 Data 
We utilize data on financial and macroeconomic aggregates from the World Development 
Indicators database for 29 countries, combined with shareholder and creditor protection data 
from the Centre for Business Research, and the KOF globalization index spanning between 1990 
and 2013. The choice of the 29 countries and the period are driven by availability of data for this 
study. The KOF index provides globalization data along economic, social and political lines. 
Economic globalization characterizes exposure to global market forces; social globalization 
captures exposure to global media, the spread of ideas, information and people; and political 
globalization characterizes diffusion of government policies, alliance with international 
organizations and bilateral relations with other countries (Gygli et al., 2018; Eppinger and 
Potrafke, 2016). 
 
2.2 Methodology 
Our baseline model is estimated via the two-stage General Method of Moment (Arellano and 
Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998) estimator specified as: 
Stage 1: We regress investor protection on the instruments and other exogenous variables: 
𝑃(𝐺𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 = 1|𝐺𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1, 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠𝑖,𝑡 , 𝑌𝑖,𝑡) =  𝛿1 +  𝛿2𝐺𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1  +
 𝛿3𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛿4𝑌𝑖,𝑡 +  𝑣𝑖 + 𝜔𝑡                                                                                                    (1) 
Stage 2: We replace the fitted value of 𝐺𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 derived from the first stage with 
𝐺𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡
∗  in the main regression (Eqn. 2): 
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟_𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐺𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡
∗ +  𝛽2𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖 + 𝜔𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡                  (2) 
where Investor_Protection is the measure of shareholder and creditor protection, 
𝐺𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 is the instrumented globalization measure (economic, social, political and 
aggregate where appropriate),  𝐺𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡
∗  is the predicted value of globalization from the 
first stage regression,  𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠𝑖,𝑡 is the instrumented information flows variable, Yit 
represents the control variables that include Trade (%GDP) and FDI flows (%GDP) capturing 
trade/economic openness; log of income per capita captures the general level of development; 
CBOE volatility index captures investors’ short-term fears about instability and uncertainty in 
global financial markets; interpolated GINI captures inequality; level of democracy captures the 
system of government; sovereign lending captures short-term sovereign lending rate in the global 
economy; urbanization captures population living in urban centres; log of population density 
captures the effects of knowledge spillovers; vi (and wt) are the country (and year) effect and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
is the error term. The choice of the Arellano–Bover/Blundell–Bond two-stage GMM accounts 
for endogeneity, time-varying endogenous effects, reverse causality and is more fitting for our 
large sample (i.e. N = 29 countries). As instruments, we use the lagged globalization index 
(specific for each model) and the level of information flows of each country. The intuition is that 
current-year integration may be positively related to prior-year integration and the country-
specific information flows to (from) other jurisdictions. However, we do not suggest that these 
instruments have a direct economic effect on investor protection, and thus they may be 
uncorrelated with the error term in the second stage regression.  We regress each globalization 
measure on the country-specific variables (trade, income per capita, CBOE volatility, FDI, GINI, 
democracy, sovereign lending, urbanization, population-density), and include the predicted 
variables in the second stage. 
 
3. Results 
3.1 Globalization and IP  
Table 1 reports the results of estimating Eqn. (1). The coefficients of our four globalization 
measures on the IP indicators, Shareholder Protection and Creditor Protection, are positive and 
statistically significant at one percent, hence suggesting that erosion of boundaries and 
integration of economies/markets, cultures, technologies and governance drive improvements in 
IP. Economically, a point increase in globalization induces an increase in Shareholder Protection 
and Creditor Protection by 0.08 (0.08) points, representing a 5.3% (5.3%) increase relative to the 
sample standard deviation for aggregate globalization of 15.1. 
 
 
 
 
 Table 1: Globalization and IP (GMM) 
 Shareholder-Protection  Creditor-Protection 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Economic Globalization 0.057***     0.048***    
 (0.012)     (0.011)    
          
Social Globalization  0.043***     0.052***   
  (0.012)     (0.016)   
          
Political Globalization   0.028***     0.028***  
   (0.007)     (0.009)  
          
Aggregate Globalization     0.080***     0.080*** 
    (0.014)     (0.015) 
          
Trade (%GDP) -0.427* 0.075 0.381** -0.209  0.304 0.632** 0.999*** 0.408 
 (0.253) (0.199) (0.169) (0.211)  (0.306) (0.300) (0.254) (0.292) 
          
Income per capita 0.733*** 0.578*** 1.032*** 0.579***  -0.262 -0.556** -0.008 -0.461** 
 (0.150) (0.219) (0.146) (0.175)  (0.169) (0.257) (0.175) (0.199) 
          
CBOE Volatility 0.009 0.004 0.008 0.003  0.007 0.001 0.006 0.002 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009)  (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
          
FDI (%GDP) 0.034 0.038 0.131 -0.017  -0.382*** -0.431*** -0.308** -0.456*** 
 (0.095) (0.099) (0.094) (0.094)  (0.134) (0.120) (0.128) (0.125) 
          
Interpolated GINI 0.001 0.039*** 0.025*** 0.034***  -0.040*** 0.001 -0.018 -0.010 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007)  (0.012) (0.015) (0.012) (0.012) 
          
Level of Democracy -0.026 -0.001 -0.039 -0.170  0.255 0.234 0.216 0.091 
 (0.245) (0.258) (0.262) (0.255)  (0.253) (0.245) (0.263) (0.248) 
          
Sovereign Lending -0.156*** -0.182*** -0.148*** -0.151***  -0.010 -0.033 0.001 -0.000 
 (0.035) (0.034) (0.033) (0.032)  (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.041) 
          
Urbanization -0.039*** -0.029*** -0.036*** -0.040***  0.022** 0.031*** 0.024*** 0.020*** 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)  (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) 
          
Population-Density 0.443*** 0.284*** 0.223*** 0.253***  0.403*** 0.243*** 0.198** 0.227*** 
 (0.068) (0.075) (0.082) (0.072)  (0.071) (0.080) (0.082) (0.073) 
          
_cons -8.270*** -7.197*** -10.373*** -7.299***  -3.268 -1.268 -5.139* -2.011 
 (1.953) (2.248) (1.867) (1.996)  (2.729) (3.308) (2.692) (2.836) 
Country Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 696 696 696 696  696 696 696 696 
K-P WF statistic 657.030 568.467 333.124 639.980  657.030 568.467 333.124 639.980 
K-P LM statistic 77.504 97.743 57.260 75.959  77.504 97.743 57.260 75.959 
Hansen J statistic 1.809 1.632 1.552 1.743  0.069 0.017 0.080 0.037 
Hansen J p-value 0.179 0.201 0.213 0.187  0.793 0.897 0.778 0.847 
Standard error robust to heteroscedasticity in parentheses and clustering at country and year level. 
*Indicates 10% significance. 
**Indicates 5% significance. 
***Indicates 1% significance. 
 
 
3.2. Globalization, Free Markets and IP  
Higher-regulated markets may favour equality over globalization and growth (Dorn et al., 2018). 
Hence, to segregate the role of legal systems, we examine whether effectively protecting 
investors necessitates not only increased globalization but also a free-market system. We capture 
free-market capitalism by the Economic Freedom Index, which measures the extent to which an 
economy is free of regulation (Gwartney and Lawson, 2003). In Table 2, we observe a significant 
impact of globalization on Shareholder Protection but an insignificant one on Creditor 
Protection. Interestingly, the coefficient of globalization is positive only when the interaction 
variable and the free market variable enter the estimation model simultaneously. The coefficients 
of globalization and free markets also increase in magnitude if the interaction term is included. 
Nevertheless, the coefficients on all interaction variables are negative and statistically 
significant. Overall, our finding indicates that globalization drives investor protection. 
 
 
 
Table 2: Globalization and IP: The Role of Free Markets (GMM) 
 Shareholder-Protection  Creditor-Protection 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Aggregate Globalization -0.014*** -0.045*** 0.222***  -0.010 -0.055 0.061 
 (0.005) (0.014) (0.051)  (0.005) (0.013) (0.039) 
        
Free Markets 0.632***  2.931***  0.677***  1.276*** 
 (0.078)  (0.489)  (0.085)  (0.360) 
        
Agg.-Globalization*Free Markets  0.006*** -0.034***   0.009*** -0.009* 
  (0.001) (0.007)   (0.001) (0.005) 
        
_cons 1.896*** 5.432*** -13.635***  0.954** 5.222*** -3.099 
 (0.463) (0.424) (3.338)  (0.458) (0.339) (2.507) 
Country Effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 642 642 642  642 642 642 
K-P WF statistic 910.239 147.919 147.834  910.239 147.919 147.834 
K-P LM statistic 167.265 191.140 68.786  167.265 191.140 68.786 
Hansen J statistic 0.159 1.228 0.409  0.001 0.076 0.020 
Hansen J p-value 0.690 0.268 0.523  0.971 0.783 0.888 
Standard error robust to heteroscedasticity in parentheses, and clustering at country and year level. 
*Indicates 10% significance. 
**Indicates 5% significance. 
***Indicates 1% significance. 
 
 
 
3.3. Globalization and IP: Does Crisis Matter? 
Evidence contends that earnings quality declined during the financial crisis particularly for 
countries with poor investor protection (Persakis and Iatridis, 2015). In Table 3, we examine the 
effects of the global downturn on the globalization-protection nexus. Our results indicate that 
globalization had a positive but immaterial effect on shareholder protection but not on creditor 
protection during the crisis. This, however, reversed post crisis. This finding indicates that legal 
protection for creditors is more closely related to underlying economic activity and reaffirms the 
necessity of government intervention and regulation to protect creditors during the financial 
crisis (Liu et al., 2016). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Globalization and IP: Does Crisis Matter? (GMM) 
 Pre-Crisis  Crisis  Post-Crisis 
 Shareholder-
Protection 
Creditor-
Protection 
 Shareholder-
Protection 
Creditor-
Protection 
 Shareholder-
Protection 
Creditor-
Protection 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Aggregate 
Globalization 
0.084*** 0.081***  0.006 0.055***  0.041** 0.069*** 
 (0.014) (0.022)  (0.020) (0.018)  (0.017) (0.012) 
         
Trade (%GDP) -0.513* 0.248  -0.474* 0.559**  -0.363 0.766*** 
 (0.272) (0.424)  (0.265) (0.282)  (0.254) (0.274) 
         
Income per capita 0.445** -0.332  0.825*** -0.480**  0.358* -0.524*** 
 (0.200) (0.293)  (0.263) (0.232)  (0.188) (0.183) 
         
CBOE Volatility 0.006 0.013  0.033 0.010  -0.018 -0.000 
 (0.012) (0.018)  (0.067) (0.088)  (0.020) (0.022) 
         
FDI (%GDP) -0.351** -0.758***  0.187 -0.151  -0.077 -0.405** 
 (0.137) (0.200)  (0.172) (0.198)  (0.120) (0.169) 
         
GINI 0.067*** 0.002  -0.032** -0.024**  -0.023** -0.014** 
 (0.009) (0.018)  (0.013) (0.010)  (0.011) (0.006) 
         
Level of Democracy 0.695** 0.157  -0.699** 0.453*  -0.731*** 0.206 
 (0.342) (0.445)  (0.301) (0.240)  (0.191) (0.219) 
         
Sovereign Lending -0.105*** -0.001  0.101 0.056  0.024 0.035 
 (0.039) (0.055)  (0.373) (0.490)  (0.145) (0.155) 
         
Urbanization -0.036*** 0.035***  -0.029*** 0.006  -0.020** 0.012 
 (0.008) (0.012)  (0.010) (0.011)  (0.008) (0.009) 
         
Population-Density -0.025 -0.014  0.151* 0.427***  0.114* 0.387*** 
 (0.074) (0.126)  (0.087) (0.047)  (0.068) (0.062) 
         
_cons -2.843 0.013  -0.077 -3.560  3.121 -4.222* 
 (2.201) (3.844)  (3.802) (3.929)  (2.559) (2.177) 
Country Effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year Effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 493 493  87 87  145 145 
K-P WF statistic 331.485 331.485  168.007 168.007  152.767 152.767 
K-P LM statistic 48.378 48.378  17.228 17.228  18.334 18.334 
Hansen J statistic 1.314 0.122  1.608 0.447  0.343 0.126 
Hansen J p-value 0.252 0.727  0.205 0.504  0.558 0.723 
Standard error robust to heteroscedasticity in parentheses, and clustering at country and year level. 
*Indicates 10% significance. 
**Indicates 5% significance. 
***Indicates 1% significance. 
 
 
3.4. Globalization and IP: Does OECD Membership Matter?  
Table 4 examines whether being a member of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) matters for our globalization-protection nexus. The OECD aims to 
promote policies that enhance economic and social well-being globally (Allin and Hand, 2017). 
Our results show that, for OECD-member countries, characterized by a common goal towards 
driving economic, commercial/financial, social and environmental change, globalization 
significantly promotes protection of both shareholders and creditors (at 1% level). For non-
OECD-member countries, we observe an insignificant impact of globalization on investor 
protection, hence suggesting that, when countries follow a common goal, they are more likely to 
provide a law enforcement system and legal structures that effectively protect property and 
enforcement rights of owners and creditors.  
Table 4: Globalization and IP: Does OECD Membership Matter? (GMM) 
 OECD-Member  Non-OECD-Member 
 Shareholder-
Protection 
Creditor-
Protection 
 Shareholder-
Protection 
Creditor-
Protection 
Aggregate Globalization 0.083*** 0.053***  0.024 0.037 
 (0.022) (0.014)  (0.027) (0.035) 
      
Trade (%GDP) -0.301 0.135  1.681*** 0.087 
 (0.309) (0.286)  (0.495) (0.895) 
      
Income per capita 0.960*** -0.553**  1.035** -0.286 
 (0.266) (0.239)  (0.509) (0.596) 
      
CBOE Volatility 0.005 0.009  0.007 -0.001 
 (0.009) (0.011)  (0.014) (0.022) 
      
FDI (%GDP) -0.026 -0.390***  -0.129 -0.249 
 (0.105) (0.138)  (0.153) (0.285) 
      
GINI -0.044 -0.057**  0.014* 0.013 
 (0.028) (0.023)  (0.008) (0.013) 
      
Level of Democracy -0.888*** 0.305  0.625 -0.768 
 (0.200) (0.263)  (0.445) (0.556) 
      
Sovereign Lending -0.127*** 0.053  -0.094 -0.230*** 
 (0.031) (0.039)  (0.063) (0.078) 
      
Urbanization -0.024* 0.019  -0.005 0.021 
 (0.013) (0.012)  (0.015) (0.022) 
      
Population-Density 0.424** 0.186  0.904*** -0.183 
 (0.169) (0.114)  (0.152) (0.221) 
      
_cons -11.694*** 4.015  -27.983*** 7.329 
 (3.664) (3.341)  (7.514) (10.078) 
Country Effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year Effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 175 175  521 521 
K-P WF statistic 726.749 726.749  115.337 115.337 
K-P LM statistic 38.123 38.123  32.047 32.047 
Hansen J statistic 0.091 0.070  2.855 0.060 
Hansen J p-value 0.763 0.791  0.091 0.807 
Standard error robust to heteroscedasticity in parentheses, and clustering at country and year level. 
*Indicates 10% significance. 
**Indicates 5% significance. 
***Indicates 1% significance. 
 
4. Conclusion  
Using panel data for 29 countries, we shed new light on the key role of globalization on investor 
protection. We observe that globalization explains how well investors, both shareholders and 
creditors, are protected particularly for least restrictive markets and OECD-member countries. 
Also, the globalization-protection nexus favoured only creditors during the crisis. Our findings 
have key policy implications. The work also complements evidence on the relation between 
globalization and economic growth, international enforceability of contracts, and cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions (Balli et al., 2018). 
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